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PETROLEUM BASED DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGY 
By Robert E. Looney 
In almost every country, industry is the glamor sector of 
economic development. People look to industrial development 
to provide much needed employment, to generate higher 
individual and national incomes, to relieve balance of payments 
constraints through import substitution, to open up markets for 
primary products such as those from the mining and fishing 
sectors, to give the country greater economic independence, to 
generate new tax revenues, and to furnish an important source 
of national pride. ( 1) By and large, these hoped for benefits of 
industrialization are desirable and realistic - provided a country 
makes sensible choices. 
The problem facing Saudi Arabia is well known. The king-
dom has to invest -its current oil revenues to develop a viable 
economic structure for the day when its oil will have been 
depleted. Industrialization is one apparently attractive strategy 
open to the government - but this is an option which needs 
careful analysis. 
First, industrialization does not inevitably lead to sustainable, 
long term growth. Based on the Iranian case, this appears to be 
particularly true if the process is largely initiated by expatriate 
companies and individuals with no permanent commitment 
to the welfare of the country. Industry is of no use if it forms a 
symbolically modern sector of the economy without developing 
ever-expanding linkages with the indigenous economy and cul-
ture. 
Second, development economists often praise industrializa-
tion for its employment-generating effects. Yet, this should not 
be a high priority for the country given its small population. Ill' 
the long run, non-oil related jobs will obviously be needed. In 
the short run, though, there may be no point in creating jobs 
which can only be filled by foreigners. (2) 
Given such doubts, is it possible to identify an industrial 
strategy which is particularly suited to the special circum-
stances of the country? And how does the existing industrial 
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strategy measure up to this ideal? 
Industrial Strategy 
Indus~rialization in the kingdom is carried out by both the 
public and private sectors. Because the country adheres to the 
concept of a free economy, the government has intervened in 
the industrial development of the country only when it felt it 
was essential for the welfare of the people. The government 
has been continuously encouraging the private sector to under-
take industrial and other investments as a means of diversifying 
the economy. When the size of the investment has been large 
and beyond the capacity of privat@ individuals, however, the 
government itself has undertaken the capital investment. A 
number of organizations have been established by the govern-
ment to develop the basic industries of the kingdom. (3) 
The Saudi Arabian government's approach to industrializa-
tion seems to have been guided by five major objectives: (4) 
1. to assure the availability of essential consumer goods, 
free of disruptions caused by international events; 
2. to lay the basis for a greatly broadened pattern of 
industrialization by starting the domestic production of 
iron and steel; 
3. to assure the availability of construction materials; 
4. to demonstrate to private investors the feasibility 
of certain industrial and mining projects by making initial 
investments in industries not previously carried on in the 
country; and 
5. to assist private investment by giving suggestions, 
technical assistance and credit or credit guarantees. 
The primary objective for industrialization is certainly the 
eventual establishment of an industrial production base which 
will reduce the country's heavy dependence on oil as its main 
source of income. 
Diversification is aimed at developing those industries that 
will maintain their economic viability over the long term and 
includes the development of hydrocarbon vased industries and 
industries contributing to national security and social prosper-
ity. To attain this goal, the government wishes on the one hand 
to establish in collaboration with foreign and domestic enter-
prise a complex of export-oriented heavy industries based on 
hvnrnrarhnn~ ann mtnPralc: lAltth a vlPlAI tn f"xnlotflTil7 the COUil-
SAUDI ARABIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGY 439 
,other hand, to providing incentives and external economies to 
the private sector to establish a number of industries supplying 
the basic consumer and development needs of the economy, 
thus reducing the country's dependence on imports. ( 5) 
These basic considerations underly most of the government's 
specific industrial objectives which include: (6) 
1. increasing the economy's capacity to produce at 
competitive costs as wide a range of products as possible 
for domestic as well as for export markets; 
2. the industrial exploitation of the substantial com-
parative advantages arising from low cost energy, raw 
materials from hydrocarbon related industry, minerals, 
agricultural and fishery resources; 
3. widening and deepening the kingdom's access to 
modern technology; 
4. achieving fuller capacity utilization in the private 
manufacturing sector; 
5. developing a regionally balanced industrial sector; 
6. increasing productivity through closer approach to 
optimal size of plants; 
7. reducing dependency on expatriate workers by 
national skill creation, through the development of general 
and technical education, and on-the-job training of nation-
al workers; and 
8. promoting interlinkage among industries. 
The main principles of the government's industrial policy 
include: (7) 
1. The encouragement of manufacturing industries, 
including agricultural industries which can effectively 
contribute to the increase of national income, to raising 
the standard of living and of employment, and to diversi-
fication of the economy. For diversifying the economy, 
the government will work towards the adoption of plans 
which, besides increasing the national income, will reduce 
the effect of outside economic disturbances and diversify 
the opportunities open to Saudi workers. 
2. The principle that the economy of the kingdom is 
based on competition between private commercial and 
industrial enterprises. In practice this implies that the 
government realizes that the objectives of industrial 
develonment mav hf" more effectivelv attained if the 
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Table l 
Industrial Licenses Implemented Ourlng 1974-77 
No. of Capital1 
Actlvitl'. Licenses Paid-U[! Authorized EmeloJ'.'.m<'!nt 
Food and Beverages 111 S24.l 1,793.3 5,213 
Textile, Clothing and Leather 
Products 11 • 46.7 132.8 1,144 
Wood Products 16 73.8 160.7 l,3o5 
Paper Products' & Printing 23 73.0 18S.S 1,303 
Chemical Products including 
Petrochemicals, Rubber & 
Plastics 78 316.S 738.3 2,318 
Construction Materials, China 
Ceramics & Glassware 262 2,509.3 5·,685.1 16,634 
Metal Products 147 Sl5.9 1,354.6 7,502 
Other Products 2 ~ 17.8 ~ 
TOTAL f;~() I. n~• ., 10,068.1 35,581 ., ......... , 
National (467) (3,009. 7) (7,201.1) (22,85?) 
Joint-venture (183) (1,062.0) (2,867.0) (12. 72.l) 
1
capital in millions of Riyals 
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ity for implementing industrial projects. 
3. The assurance that businessmen who are prepared to 
take the risks of success and failure motivated by prospects 
of profits will enjoy the full support of the government 
during all stages of the preparation, establishment, and 
operation of industrial projects beneficial to the kingdom. 
4. The philosophy that competition serving the inter-
ests of local consumers is the best means of influencing 
the business community in the industrial field. 
5. The belief that the imposition of quantitative restric-
tions or of control on prices as a means for implementing 
the industrial policy will be avoided if at all possible; i.e., 
the government does not intend to impose restrictions 
except in cases in which competition cannot have an 
effective role (as in the case of commodities which by their 
nature are characterized by monopoly). 
6. The right of the business community in the industrial 
field to select, utilize and manage the economy resources, 
including industrial workers, insofar as this does not con-
flict with statutes in force. 
7. The attraction of foreign capital as well as foreign 
expertise and their participation in the industrial develop-
ment projects in cooperation with Saudi businessmen. 
8. Assurances to foreign capital that there will be no 
restrictions on the entry and exit of money to and from 
the kingdom, and that the government shall continue its 
policy based on the respect for private ownership required 
Islamic law. 
9. The provision that in addition the government will 
attempt to promote the growth of all economic sectors 
suitable local resources available to producers in sufficient 
quantities and to ensure increasing purchasing power of 
consumers within the framework of an ever growing 
national economy. 
Early Attempts at Industrialization 
In view of the country's almost total lack of modern infra-
structure in the early 1950s the government's first programs 
were devoted, in the main, to updating and expanding existing 
facilities, with little emphasis on new industrial investments. 
This period saw the rapid expansion of new road and rail net-
,.-- ...... ~-- _, __ .1,._ .c __ ...l-.:-1 .. ;_ ..... ....... rl 
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industrial use, and the laying of the foundations for a modern 
communications system. (8) 
In 1954 Saudi Arabia made an unsuccessful effort to incor-
porate the oil industry into its economy through an agreement 
with Aristotle Onassis whereby all Saudi Arabian oil that was 
not transported by tankers directly owned by the concession 
companies would be transported by a joint government-Onassis 
tanker line. The concession companies protested this action 
since most of their oil was transported by chartered ships. 
Eventually in 1958, this shipping agreement was declared to 
be a violation of the 1933 concession agreement by a three 
member arbitration board. (9) · 
Based on this experience, the government felt that little 
progress could be made in utilizing the existing oil sector as an 
instrument through which it could diversify the economy. As an 
alternative the government established its own national oil 
company, Petromin, in 1962 to try to attain these goals on its 
own. 
Petro min 
The General Petroleum and Minerals Organization - Petro-
min - was established by the government largely to develop 
industries. based on petroleum, natural gas, and minerals. Be-
sides prospecting, exploration and drilling, Petromin has under-
taken a number of activities in the field of oil, such as oil pro-
duction, refining, transportation, distribution and marketing. 
Petromin has initiated a number of studies to establish various 
hydrocarbon based industries, and since its inception has been 
active in many sectors of the economy. 
In general Petromin has been active in three main areas: 
1. development of local industry through exploration, 
production, purchase, sale, transportation, distribution, 
and marketing of petroleum and minerals; 
2. ventures with other companies and/or participation 
in their capital so as to enter in all areas of industry as 
stated in 1); and 
3. additional power to import any oil products or 
minerals as needed by Saudi Arabia. 
During most of the 1960s and into the 1970s, there was a 
surplus of oil in the world market. Lacking foreign markets or a 
<mho:t<anti<a1 rr11nP 0:11nnhr thP rnmn<anv rnnrPntr<atPn on thP 
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Development by the Early 1970s 
Despite these initial efforts, little progress had been made 
towards building up an industrial base by the late 1960s. This 
is evidenced by the results of several surveys beginning with the 
1962 Industrial Census. ( 11) Unfortunately, these early surveys 
and census are not strictly comparable because of differences 
in comprehensiveness. Nevertheless, a fairly consistent picture 
emerges. 
By the early 1970s, industry was still dominated by firms in 
services, trade and commerce. In general, industry was charac-
terized by: 1) the small number of employees per establish-
ment; 2) the lead construction had in large establishments, and 
3) the high percentage of manufacturing establishments employ-
ing only 1 to 4 persons (about 90 percent). 
Of particular significance was the apparent relative increase 
between 1967 and 1971 in the number of establishments 
employing 1 to 4 persons, and the drop in the number of 
establishments employing 100 and over. 
While the industrial surveys for these years may have been 
incomplete in their coverage, there was in any case no clear 
evidence that larger establishments were becoming more pre-
dominant. In fact, the average number of workers per establish-
ment actually dropped from 3.09 for 1967 to 2.4 for 1971. 
(However this drop is probably the result of the much wider 
coverage of cities and establishments in the 1971 census which 
undoubtedly resulted in increasing the number of establish-
ments with small employment included in the survey.) 
Several other features are of interest. First, the average 
capital output ratio (based on the 1969 census) was about 
1.:1. Second, wages represented one-fifth of the total produc-
tion, while raw materials represented 36 percent. J:'hird, food 
and beverages, and cement and non-ferrous metal products 
accounted for over half the total product. Together with trans-
port equipment and wood and furniture, these branches em-
ployed 73 percent of the country's industrial workers. However, 
cement and non-ferrous metal products had by far the largest 
size per average establishment in terms of capital invested, value 
of raw materials, wages, value-added, and total product. Only in 
terms of workers per establishment does cement and non-
ferrous metal products fall behind the three other branches. 
- .. .. - ---- - -
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sistent picture of a very primitive industrial structure. In addi-
tion, several commentators on the period have noted that 
industry was still beset by a number of difficulties including: 
1) a shortage of national industrial entrepreneurship as well as 
managerial, technical, supervisory, and skilled manpower, and 
2} certain cultural influences pertaining to attitudes toward 
work, work intensity, incentives, and the like, which tended to 
depress productivity, especially at the lower skill levels. 
In 1970 a survey of 294 manufacturing establishments from 
the largest, such as Aramco's refinery, to most of those hiring 
only ten people provided the first glimpse at the structure of 
large scale industry. · 
Because the large Aramco refinery was included, the Eastern 
Province had nearly 70 percent of the capital but employed 
only 34 percent of the workforce. The Western area employed 
nearly 24 percent of the capital and 45 percent of the work-
force. The central region employed 7 percent of the capital 
and 20 percent of the workers. Other areas had almost no large 
industry even when the category required only ten workers in 
a plant to qualify. 
The 1970 survey found that most of the plants operated 
substantially below capacity. Underutilization averaged 64 
percent for the plants surveyed. The reason the plants failed 
to operate near full capaicty was not given, but presumably 
included shortages of skilled manpower and materials, competi-
tion from imports, and limited domestic markets. The under-
utilization of capacity continued into the mid-1970s for some 
of the important industries. 
The 1971 industrial survey shows a similar pattern for that 
year:(12} . 
1. About 66 percent of all firms were engaged in commerce. 
Manufacturing was a poor second at 16 percent, followed by 
services at 4 percent. 
2. While the largest number of manufacturing establishments 
were located in the Western Province, 32 percent of all persons 
employed in these firms were unpaid family workers. This 
percentage rose to 45 percent for firms engaged in commerce. 
Also for that year, one person establishments accounted for 
about 60 percent of all. establishments, and those with less 
than 10 workers represented 98 percent of all establishments 
in the kingdom. In contrast, firms in the oil sector, while few 
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in number , employed more than 50 persons each. 
In 1972 a survey showed a similar pattern in that: 
1. About 65 percept of all firms operated in food and 
textile activities. These firms were found to be small family 
undertakings. 
2. Less than 0.5 percent of these firms employed more than 
50 persons. 
3. The relative contribution to the GDP of large and small 
firms was in reverse to their sizes. 
The picture of Saudi manufacturing in the early 1970s is, 
therefore, one dominated by small firms. In 1971 nearly 95 per-
cent employed fewer· than five persons. These firms were 
essentially handicraft shops and accounted for nearly half of 
the employment in all of the manufacturing sector. Presumably 
most of these firms were smiths (working with gold, silver, 
brass, and iron), carpenters (making carved screens, panels, 
and doors), and handloom weavers (weaving products like the 
famous wool cloaks from Hufuf). Food processing was the 
final area of activity. 
A second group of small scale manufacturing establishments, 
numbering 7 46 employed between five and nine workers. These 
shops probably had little more than simple equipment. The 
range of activities probably included book binding and perhaps 
some printing, the manufacturing of bricks and other building 
materials, repairing by small machine shops, food processing, 
and wool and metal forming. 
More than one-half of the small scale industry was located 
in the Hejaz and northern Asir. A little over one-quarter of the 
manufacturing was in the central area, reflecting the growing 
urbanization around Riyadh and some of the oases of the 
Najd. The Eastern Province contained less than one-fifth of the 
establishments, and the northern and southern areas the remain-
der. 
In general by 1971, the major difficulties for large scale 
industry were as they had been a decade earlier: 
1. insufficient clarity in industrial policy and inade-
quacy concerning commercial and contractual relations; 
2. slowness in government departments and the pro-
liferation of agencies . dealing with industrial establish-
ments; 
3. costliness of labor and the need to rely on expatri-
ates whose visas and residence permits took an inordinate-
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ly long time to obtain; 
4. costliness of imported raw materials and irregularity 
in their flow; 
5. the large volume of capital investment required 
generally, owing to the inability of most establishments to 
enjoy large scale protection which was in tum at least 
partially due to the preference-for imported goods in the 
market, and finally 
6. the inadequacy of certain public facilities like 
electricity, roads and means of communication, and 
data provided by the competent government agencies. 
Recent Initiatives 
Since the early 1970s, the basic structure of industry has 
changed dramatically and is beginning to take on a more mod-
em form. This process has been brought about by three major 
factors: 
1. The use of formal economic planning for the development 
of both the public and private sectors, beginning with the First 
Five Year Plan (1970-75). 
2. The decrees, regulations and incentives which the govern-
ment uses to solicit the participation of the Saudi and foreign 
private entrepreneurs. 
3. The tremendous economic power which the government 
derives from its increased oil revenues. 
Before the First Plan was crystallized, certain priorities 
were assigned to the role of industry in the country's develop-
ment. These involved: 
1. The conscious decision that, wherever possible, private 
investment should be encouraged and furthermore supported 
by the supply of certain essential services by the government. 
2. An impetus to move government sector investment into 
a number of basic heavy industries. 
3. The creation of industrial estates to facilitate industrializa-
tion and at the same try to minimize heavy concentrations of 
industry and population, thus avoiding an overload on existing 
urban locations. 
The sharp increase in oil revenues in the mid-1970s had 
removed the financial constraint on industrial development. 
Money was available to finance any project thought desirable. 
Tl.. ... C.a.,..-. ..... A n~n:u~aln.Tit.YnAn+ Dlf'.lln fl 07 h,_SlJl\ UT~li:: nrPn~rPrl 1n thlc::. 
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lent of nearly U.S. $15 billion over the plan period (excluding 
projects in electricity and transportation). It was anticipated 
that private investment would also add sufficiently to industrial 
investment. 
Incentives for the Private Sector 
Because of some hesitancy on the part of Saudi entrepreneurs 
to invest in manufacturing, the government has increasingly 
been involved in the economy through the enactment of a series 
_of incentives designed to increase the profitability of this type 
of investment and/or reduce the uncertainty of the invest-
ment. (13) 
Tariffs Exchange Rates, Excise Taxes: The government is 
committed to the preservation of free trade, to a fixed exchange 
rate, and to the absence of restrictions on foreign exchange or 
on the remittance of net earnings. In August 1974 tariffs were 
reduced significantly as a measure to control the cost of living. 
Foods, medicine, raw materials, and machinery are tariff free, 
but again, the tariff could reach 20 percent if it is to protect 
domestic industry. 
Subsidies in Cash: In 1974 the government abolished taxes 
on fuels leading to a substantial cost reduction for business 
users. In addition to what might be the lowest fuel cost in the 
world, the government has reduced the electricity rate to 
SR .05 per kilowatt hour for industrial uses. The electric gener-
ating firms are, however, privately owned and in order to 
guarantee a fair rate of return to them, a subsidy program was 
initiated in 1974. The problem arose largely because the power 
stations are small and costs are high. Costs could be reduced by 
enlarging capacity, but demand is not sufficient. Guaranteeing 
a fair return to enlarge power stations in this case 1ed to the 
company's claims for some sort of subsidy. 
In recognition of the effect of the rising cost of construction 
on the willingness and ability of private investors to undertake 
new projects or expand existing ones, the government took it 
upon itself to subsidize building materials. Cement is the only 
subsidized material, but producers in several other areas have 
requested subsidies. 
To enlarge expansion of farm output and improvement of 
farm productivity, the government administers one of the 
rnnntru'c: nlnPc:t c:11hc:;nu nrnar,.mc: S11hc:;(f;p., rnvPr" c:11hc:t,.nt;,.1 
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The government discriminates in favor of Saudi agricultural 
producers of government supplies by accepting their bids even 
though their prices may be up to 10 percent higher than the 
similar imported supplies. 
In ~973, th~ government began subsidizing the importation 
of basic food items such as wheat, flour, sugar, and rice in an 
effort to reduce the cost of living. Appropriations in the first 
year of the pr~~am totalled SR 300 million. During 1974-75, 
more commodities such as milk, milk products, and vegetables 
were added to the list of subsidized food items. The budget 
appropriations have increased accordingly to SR 800 million. In 
addi~ion to cement and fertilizers, -these subsidized products 
proVIde the only examples of price control in Saudi Arabia. 
Financial Assistance 
The Saudi Industrial Development Fund was established in 
1974 to finance new industrial ventures on concessionary terms. 
Medium to long term loans (average seven years) are granted to 
co~pa~es. The Fund's program to date has taken on a specific 
onentatlon: 
1. Loans are made to companies able to demonstrate a likeli-
hood of their products being financially and economically 
viable and fitting the government's development criteria. 
2. Capital and energy intensive projects are encouraged; 
labor intensive projects are looked on with less favor. 
3. Funds covering up to 50 percent of a project's capital 
requirements are lent at a cost of around 2 percent a year. 
4. The government is reluctant to impose new tariffs al-
though it does grant in special cases protection up to 20 per-
cent. 
5. Incentives and subsidies in the form of low interest rates, 
low utility rates, low tax xates are the preferred methods of 
channeling funds into the industrial sector. 
During the period 1974/75 to 1978/79, the Fund approved 
506 industrial loans involving a total amount of SR 5,416 
million. The loans disbursed during 1978/79 amounted to 
SR 1,117 million, thus raising the total loan disbursements to 
SR 3,414 million. 
To support the activities of SIDF, the Industrial Studies 
Development Center (ISDC) has undertaken a number of 
feasibility studies to identify projects likely to be attractive to 
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the private sector. (14) 
The criteria used to determine likely candidates for invest-
ment are based on ISDC's perception of the inclinations of 
Saudi entrepreneurs. ISDC's view of investor preferences is that: 
1. Demonstration of existing demand plays a fundamental 
role in assuring investors of the absence of risk. Because Saudi 
businessmen are conservative by nature and tradition, it is logi-
cal that they would prefer import substitution type industries. 
2. In responding to the government's incentives, projects 
that display externalities or linkages on both the supply and 
demand side would be favored by the private sector. 
3. Saudi entrepreneurs are profit maximizers. It is thus 
assumed by ISDC that throughout the massive program of 
government assistance and expenditure, private investors will 
find that an expected yield of at least 20 percent rate of return 
on investment is sufficient inducement. This rate is assumed to 
be fair in comparison with returns on conventional alternative 
uses such as commerce. 
A second important financial development has been the 
establishment of the Public Investment Fund (PIF). This organ-
ization was established in 1971 to meet the credit requirements 
of public corporations engaged in commercial or industrial 
activities, especially Petromin and SABIC. Cumulative loan 
disbursements by the Fund between 1972/73 and 1978/79 
reached SR 10, 812 million while domestic ;µid foreign invest-
ments stood at SR 4,750 million and SR 973 million, respec-
tively. 
Industrial Estates 
One of the most helpful facilities provided by government to 
the private sector to encourage industrial expansion has been 
the establishment of industrial estates which besides allocating 
land plots at nominal rates are also equipped with utilities, 
workshops, transportation facilities, communications channels, 
banks and other necessities. The Riyadh, J eddah and Dammam 
estates have witnessed considerable expansion. The area of the 
Riyadh estate has been expanded from 451,028 square meters 
to 21,000,000 square meters; that of Jeddah estate from 
1,044,008 square meters to 9,100,000 square meters; and 
that of the Dammam estate from 994,653 square meters to 
24,000,000 square meters. Work is in progress for setting up 
industry in Mecca, Qasim, Hafuf, Medinah, and Abha. 
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Sudsidies in Kind 
The ambitious nature of the government programs to develop 
the country's social and economic infrastructure are evident 
from the size of government expenditure. These programs lower 
business costs significantly. 
The government has established industrial parks in major 
industrial and trading zones of the country. These estates are 
planned to provide all basic infrastructures essential to business 
firms; i.e., water, electricity, telephone, banking, post office, 
police, and fire protection services. Lots in these industrial 
parks are available to prospective users at a nominal rent. 
Several institutions provide research, c_onsulting, and training 
services to the business sector either free or at a nominal cost. 
ISDC vocational training institutions and agricultural extension 
services are part of this effort. 
Licensing 
Licensing is obligatory for new or joint industrial projects. 
Saudi firms who expect to seek government protection and 
assistance must also be licensed. Government licensing provide 
assurances prior to the undertaking of feasibility studies, that 
the projects will contribute to plan fulfillment. 
Taxes 
Saudi business firms pay a tax called Zakat at a rate of 2.5 
percent on their wealth.(15) Except for that, there are no 
property, income, or sales taxes on Saudi firms. Because most 
small businessmen do not keep accurate records and the con-
sequent difficulty of auditing by the tax authorities, most of 
these firms end up paying little or no tax. The light burden of 
this tax and the absence of other taxes makes business an 
attractive activity which seems to be in line with Moslem 
tradition. 
Non-oil foreign businesses, however, pay income tax at a rate 
of 25-45 percent on net income. Oil companies are taxed at a 
higher rate of 55 percent on net operating income. Joint ven-
tures, with at least a 25 percent Saudi share, are granted a tax 
holiday for five years commencing from the production date. 
Qualifying joint ventures, according to the foreign investment 
law, enjoy all "other" advantages granted to Saudi firms. 
It is aooarent that taxes navah1P hv thP S:nul;., :irP :in 1nPf-
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fective instrument for changing the pattern of resource alloca-
tion. It is perhaps for that reason that the government relies 
more heavily on negative taxes rather than subsidies in its 
effort to increase the non-oil GDP. As for foreign business 
firms, the tax breaks which they are entitled to are highly con-
ducive for those firms with Saudi participation. Currently, there 
is an effort under way to reform the rules for the taxation of 
foreign companies to accelerate foreign participation in devel-
opment projects. 
· Other Incentives 
Aside from government policies Aramco has perceived the 
need for support industries. (16) That company has identified 
opportunities and assisted prospective entrepreneurs in estab-
lishing enterprises in construction, mechanical and maintenance 
contracting, transport, offshore servicing, catering, and many 
other fields related primarily to the company's own needs. (17) 
After 197.3 the enormous investment in government revenues 
rapidly disseminated to the populace encouraged a boom in 
construction and consumer goods, and thus created a sufficient-
ly substantial market to interest local merchants in establishing 
import substitution industries. 
Industrial Growth 
Encouraged by the government's policy of providing services, 
subsidized plots in industrial estates, cheap power and inexpen-
sive finance, and benefitting by the appalling delays in landing 
goods in 1976-77 due to port congestion, private Saudi firms 
responded with an unprecedented wave of activity. In the 
1974-77 period alone, over 600 new industrial plants were 
initiated and in the implementation stage (Table 1). 
As a result of this growth, Saudi Arabia is now virtually self-
sufficient in the principal building materials: production of 
cement, clay concrete and sand lime bricks, tiles, aggregate, 
precast concrete and prefabrication systems, doors, windows, 
and a number of other items. The same applies to screws, steel, 
scaffolding and reinforcing mesh, fencing, insulation materials, 
air conditioning and desert coolers. Because of their high ratio 
of volume and weight to value, many of these items were 
obvious choices for local production. More recently, emphasis 
has hf'f'n nl:irPrl nn rnn.,nmPr annrl.,_ Fnnrl..tnff., frPnrPcPntPrl 
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meat processing facilities, household goods (plastic bags, con-
tainers, detergents, insecticides, and other chemicals, furniture 
and furnishings, household applicances (such as refrigerators), 
all contribute to lessen dependence on the importation of such 
items of consumption. 
Conclusions 
The future, while very bright for the private sector, will not 
take care of itself, however. Certain difficulties exist and numer-
ous obstacles to change exist. The most serious difficulties 
center around the fact that: 
1. Reliable statistics on current output, investment, employ-
ment, and industrial capacity are no( available. While there 
have been several censuses of manufactures, these censuses are 
out of date and the new ones kept confidential. 
2. Government machinery operates weakly with an occas-
ionally competent individuals presiding over a cumbersome and 
inexperienced administration apparatus. 
3. Private businessmen have not yet learned to operate 
effectively developing schemes as government laws and incen-
tives change rapidly. 
4. Few government people are familiar with the mechanics 
and problems of industry. 
5. Nearly all planning activity is centralized in Riyadh, with 
a consequent limiting effect on the planners' perspectives. Over-
centralization is not a fault of the planners' approach to their 
task; it simply reflects the historical policy of not allowing 
local government and private interest groups to become too 
strong. 
6. And finally, the limited size of the market makes it 
difficult to foresee a long vigorous growth in import substitu-
tion projects, since many of the available sectors, particularly 
in building materials, are now in a domestic supply-demand 
equilibrium. In foodstuffs, plastics, chemicals, and metal 
working opportunities still undoubtedly exist. 
Increasingly, however attention must be focused on export 
possibilities using feedstock from the large petrochemical plants 
planned for Yanbo and J ubail. The extent to which downstream 
export factories will be erected depends upon the government's 
app:i;oach. By maintaining a cheap capital and energy supply, 
and bv subsidizing the necessarv raw materials. many possibili-
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